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Political corruption, as a means by which money influences politics (Key 1936), 
is clearly determined by the characteristics of the principal actor in the political 
system: the party. Samuel Huntington, in particular, has linked the development 
of corruption to party weakness during phases of growing political participation. 
In this hypothesis, corruption spreads in those specific paths to modernization in 
which popular participation in political decision-making is not immediately 
accompanied by a strengthening of those institutions which should filter and 
direct collective demands: “the weaker and less accepted the political parties, the 
greater the likelihood of corruption” (Huntington 1968, 71). Apparently in 
contradiction with this hypothesis is the widespread belief that corruption is 
favored by the ubiquity and omnipotence of the parties, powerful and well- 
organized political machines capable of controlling civil society and the market. 
In Italy, partitocrazia, a concept derived from the political science literature, has 
been taken up in the press and in the political debate to stigmatize the ills of the 
“First Republic”.
In what follows, I will present some hypotheses deriving from a research 
on the Italian case. A main advantage of the case study is the possibility to 
understand the linkages between political parties and corruption on the bases of a 
thick description. A main disadvantage is, however, that the case study does not 
allow to control for the generalizability of the hypotheses developed in a specific 
context. In this paper, I shall attempt to go beyond the Italian case, introducing 
illustrations from studies on corruption in other countries, among others the 
contribution to the conference on political parties and corruption, organized by 
the Robert Schuman Centre in March 1999, covering countries such as France, 
Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Venezuela.
I. How the Conditions of the Party System Influence the Spread of 
Corruption*
Research on corruption often looked for causal factors that could increase the 
propensity of individual and collective actors to offer or accept bribes. As far as 
the characteristics of parties and party systems are concerned, the analysis of the 
Italian case allows putting forward the following hypotheses.
’ Many ideas presented in this paper come from previous cooperation with Alberto Vannucci. 



























































































Hypothesis l. Political Corruption is Favored by “Cartel" Parties, with Low 
Ideological Attachments and a Limited Role for Activists.
Although limited forms of corruption may develop also in ideological mass 
parties, corruption increases especially with forms of cartel parties, with fluid 
ideology and small grass-roots presence (on the definition of cartel party, Katz 
and Mair 1995). In Italy, when the scandals exploded in the nineties, the structure 
of the parties did not correspond to a model of partitocrazia. As Pizzomo noted:
The term partitocrazia is not suitable for such a system. The very term 
“party” is a term of the open political discourse ... Certainly it is too indistinct a 
term for the language of analysis. There are not many acts easily imputable to a 
party as such. The term partitocrazia comes from a period in which the parties 
acted as collective subjects, guided by powerful leaderships responsible, if not to 
the membership as such, at least to elite circles composed of members. The 
leadership could answer for their members, parliamentary groups and mass 
associations before other actors within the political system, represented for their 
part by other parties. Decisions regarding the selection of political personnel were 
taken by the party leaderships according to largely pre-established rules (1993, 
304-5).
In fact, recent research on political corruption indicated its widespread 
presence exactly where mass parties were not present. Low levels of militantism 
and rootedness in the society, a high degree of personalization, and pragmatism 
have been quoted to explain corruption in Spain. Legalized in 1977, the political 
parties of the Spanish republic remained always weak in organizational terms, 
with a very low 6% of party members on the total population. In fact, it has been 
observed that the Spanish parties developed from parties of notables in the 
beginning of the century to the contemporary parties of electors, skipping the 
phase of the mass parties. Spanish political parties “have tended to become 
increasingly oligarchic, with a growing divorce between leaders and members and 
little effort expended on membership recruitment” (Heywood 1998, 14). 
Notwithstanding the small number of members, the Spanish parties have however 
a large (and expansive) organizational structure, widespread on all the national 
territory, and which imply the need for many paid functionaries (Heywood 1997, 
73-6). Lacking a grass-roots base of supporters, the political parties have to relay 
upon other sources: “The rate of public income in the treasury of Spanish political 
parties is probably the highest in Europe: 100 percent for the PSOE and 90 for the 
‘Partido Popular’. And ... the income from membership is particularly low: 1 per 
mil for the PSOE and 1,5% for the second” (Pujas 1996, 4). Similar conditions 
have been recalled to explain the development of corruption in the other Southern 




























































































Portugal and Greece (Magone 1996, 16). In particular, for the Portuguese case, 
with the exception of the Communist parties, all the other parties have been 
defined as “parties of notables”, with a weak organizational structure, often 
structured around personal clienteles both at the local and national level (Pinto de 
Sousa 1999).
Even in countries that had seen the development of mass parties, the spread 
of corruption came together with a decline in the ideological attachments by party 
voters as well as activists. For instance, in an analysis of political scandals in 
Austria, Pelinka observed that “the political parties have lost much of their 
original ideological character. One of the consequences of this 'secularization 
process' has been the increase of various pragmatic 'machinations' and the quest 
for nonideological 'deals' which not only have led to a deideologization of the 
parties but also to a concomitant proliferation and legitimation of individual 
careerism. Often linked to schemes of personal enrichment, the loss of ideology 
has upon occasion also led to an increase in the temptation toward criminal 
deeds” (1988, 169). The spread of corruption has been related to the 
organizational weakness of political parties in such different context as Latin 
America—for instance, the fragmentation in Columbia, with 628 electoral lists in 
the 1994 elections (Zuluaga Nieto 1996; Njaim, 1996)—or France (Ruggiero 
1996).
Political corruption does not seems therefore to be a side effect of 
ideological mass parties; it grows instead with the transformation of the political 
parties into “cartel parties”. In cartel parties, in fact, “Political entrepreneurs face 
serious financial problems. Not only are there no party members to voluntary help 
with their campaigns, there are no party members paying their dues either. The 
party has to buy in services, but has no income, or projected income, with which 
to do it” (Hopkins 1996, 15). Unable to mobilize a stable constituency, with no 
membership available for paying for the party expenses, and a political class who, 
lacking ideological motivations, sees enrichment as the only selective incentives 
to politics, these political parties would be more and more available to corrupt 
practices.
Hypothesis 2. Political Corruption is Favored by High Costs o f Politics.
Political corruption increases with the cost of politics. In Italy, the high number of 
parties and elections and, especially, the development of clientelistic exchanges 
between voters and candidates are all elements that increased political cost, 
fuelling corruption. The decline of long-term loyalties to political subcultures and 
the mass-mediatization of electoral campaigns contributed to the escalation of 




























































































political parties were unable to solve the problems (della Porta and Vannucci 
1999b). 1
In line with the Italian case, also the Japanese example illustrates very well 
the way in which corruption interacts with the (enormous) costs of political 
activities. In Japan, where during the long staying in power of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (1955-1993) nine of the fifteen prime ministers have been 
implicated in political scandals, the costs of politics are so high that political 
corruption has been defined as a “redistribution system”, in which political bosses 
collects bribes and, at least in part, distribute them to their followers in the form 
of services and donations of various kind (Bouissou 1997).
Comparative research indicated a strong, positive correlation between 
electoral campaign expenditures and corruption (Heidenheimer 1998). An 
increase in the costs of campaigning has been observed, in recent times, as a 
consequence of the presence of new media of communication: “The ‘media 
revolution’ has clearly exacerbated this problem by allowing previously 
prohibited private broadcasts and pushing up information, propaganda, and 
campaign costs. At the same time, the ‘office revolution’ caused by the spread of 
new technology (personal computers, photocopying and fax machines), required 
large investments to provide party headquarters and party owned newspaper with 
new equipment. Finally, ... salary expenditures reveal real increases in the major 
parties’ official budgets” (Rhodes 1996, 10). In Italy, as well as Spain and 
France, the increasing role of the media in the electoral campaigns changed the 
role of party competition: “Greater use of the media helps create new rules of 
party competition, based on leadership-focused contests, which weakens the 
traditional character of parties and increase the costs of politics” (Pujas and 
Rhodes 1998a, 5). Researches on different countries converge in indicating that 
public financing does not, per se, thwart corruption.
1 In Italy, the Law 195/74 was voted in 1974 after a big scandal related to illegal party 
financing in order to regulate the field by introducing public financing and rules for private 
financing (Rhodes 1996, 8-9). After the first law had been abrogated by referendum in April 
1993, new laws substituted the subventions to parties with the remboursement of campaign 
spending to candidates (law 515/93) and regulated political financing through tax payments 
(law 2/1997). A strong relation between irregular campaign financing and political corruption 
was found also in Brazil (Fleisher 1997). Viceversa, the low costs of electoral campaigns in 





























































































Hypothesis 3. Corruption is Favored by the Fragmentation o f Political Parties 
and, therefore, Internal Competition Between Candidates o f the Same Party.
Research on the Italian case indicated that corruption spread where political 
parties were internally fragmented in various factions. Especially before the 
reform of the electoral system, the possibility for the voters to choose the 
candidates inside the party lists (the so-called voto di preferenza) fuelled harsh 
(and expensive) battles between candidates belonging to the same party. Usually, 
the development of non-ideological, personalistic fractions, in an eternal war with 
each other.
Also in Japan, an electoral system with preference votes for the single 
candidates has brought about enormous expenses for the electoral campaigns, in 
particular those of conservative candidates who compete with each other in the 
same constituencies. If the candidates of the opposition usually relay upon the 
support of their party, conservative candidates instead have to conquer their votes 
one by one. The cost of an electoral campaign is in fact four time higher for a 
candidate of the government than for one of the opposition, because only the first 
has to face internal competition by other members of the party (Bouissou 1997). 
The clients are organized in Koenkai, or support organizations, with an average 
of ten- to thirty-thousands members for a MP of the conservative party: each of 
them is formed by a networks of small groups, built around particular social 
categories or recreational activities.2 Because of internal competition, in order to 
avoid to “loose” his Koenkai in favor of a rival party-colleague, each candidate 
has to employ ten to fifteen secretaries, whose task is to organize specific groups, 
distributing gifts (in particular at marriage or funeral) or invitations to parties or 
journeys (Bouissou 1997, 136-8). During electoral campaigns, conservative 
aspirant MPs offer in fact concrete rewards to their supporters: “Apart from 
campaign literature, he or his staff will usually hand over a cash filled envelope 
(‘for your trouble’ - like posting his campaign poster at the wall of the residence) 
to his presumed supporters and voters during house calls in his district. Another 
must are regular organized all expenses paid trips to Tokyo or wining & dining at 
regional spas for members of the thousands strong local support organizations 
(Koen Kai), as well as any amount of charitable and individual donations” 
(Rothacher 1996, 3).
2 In Japan, in fact, ‘The incredibly high cost of political campaigning and the blatant illegality 
of many campaign practices discourages voters from working actively in elections, thereby 
impelling Japanese political candidates to develop their personal support association, known as 
koenkai, which are manned by political pros, while providing services to mass constituencies 




























































































Both in Italy and in Japan, the cost of electoral campaigns were therefore 
related with the degree of competition between candidates belonging to the same 
party. Also in Belgium, “the expansion of the occult financing of political parties 
in the 1970s and 1980s coincided with a drastic increase of party fragmentation 
and government volatility, not during a period of stable party monopoly or 
duopoly of executive power” (de Winter 1998, 12). As Jean Cartier-Bresson 
(1999) observed, the costs of corruption increases for parties with a decentralized 
structure, where each fraction forms its own network of corrupt exchange. In 
France, since the seventies, more and more decentralized forms of corruption 
spread the collection of bribes to the lower levels of the political and 
administrative hierarchy, with a shift from corruption as a means of party 
financing to corruption for personal enrichment.
Hypothesis 4. Corruption is Favored by the Development o f Collusive 
Agreements Between the Different Parties.
Collusive interactions between parties, jeopardizing competition, reduce control 
on party involvement in corrupt exchanges. In Italy, the spread of corruption was 
facilitated by the long-term dominance of the Christian-Democratic party that 
governed Italy (although often in coalition with other small parties) for more than 
three decades. In this situation, both the governmental party and the opposition 
became, in a certain sense, “non-responsive” to the electorate (Sartori 1970). 
Moreover, the two largest parties, Christian Democracy and the Communist 
Party, fiercely fighting each other in the visible public spheres, bargained with 
each other in secret, creating the bases for the collusive agreements related with 
corruption.
As in Italy also in Japan, corruption seems to have been fuelled by one- 
party dominant systems. As Susan Pharr noticed for the Japanese system, “Long­
term party rules makes systemic the distribution system by which supporters are 
rewarded at the expenses of non-supporters” (1998, 3). In fact, in Japan, one- 
party rule increased citizens’ tolerance of corruption, with particularly “soft” 
attitudes between young and well-educated people (ibid.). To take another 
example, in Portugal, corruption flourished during the long-lasting occupation of 
power by the Social Democratic party (between 1985 and 1995) of Cavaco Silva, 
favoured by the lack of a “politically feasible” opposition (Pinto de Sousa 1999).
In the Belgian case, as in the Italian one, corruption was facilitated by 
another characteristic of the system that tends to reduce competition between 
parties: consociationalism (Frognier 1986). In fact, “the more occult dealings 
between élites, the greater the chances for corruption. Also, in a consociational 




























































































and to minimize the harmful effects of the revelations of the scandals that involve 
them. They thus protect themselves 'chain of denunciation’ which, from one 
particular scandal, may escalate and threaten to challenge in one way or another 
the political world as a whole. It is likely that a consociational democracy is more 
susceptible than other forms of government to develop this type of collective 
response, thanks to the 'cartelisation of elites', their capacity to control leaders 
within one’s own pillar and to avoid conflicts that could result in chain of 
denunciations and ultimately political disaster” (de Winter 1998, 14-15). More in 
general, the “cartelization” of parties increases their tendency to collude, reducing 
competition for membership and pushing instead towards a large agreement on 
the use of public funds.
In general, therefore, political competition introduces controls on party 
activities, and these controls may jeopardize corruption. As Michael Johnston 
(1998, 13) observed,
Significant and institutionalized political competition creates opportunities for political 
forces to win or lose power through publicly visible processes. A very wide range of 
issues can drive such competition, but where corruption is a serious problem it can be 
raised by opposition parties, and voters can remove those in government who have abused 
their power. Strongly competitive parties have an interest in protecting independent arenas 
of appeal against corruption, both in the judiciary and in investigative agencies. They can 
encourage, protect, and follow through on direct responses to corruption by citizens and 
civil society groups — building resistance to corruption in civil society, in place of the 
kinds of evasive or illicit responses common where citizens are vulnerable to exploitation 
and have little political recourse.
Not all types of competition, however, jeopardize corruption. According to 
Johnston (1998, 15-16), “good competition”
must be meaningful, but structured... The organizational strength of parties is 
important too: where parties are internally divided along factional lines or cross-cut by 
other loyalties (ranging from ethnic divisions to ideological fights to the influences of 
localism in societies such as the United States), or where electoral systems encourage 
intra-party contention, the decisiveness of competition between parties can be reduced. 
Splinter groups of losing parties may cut side-deals with the winners for support in a new 
parliament, while factions of the governing party may demand deals of their own. The 
leverage of both kinds of factions will be increased where electoral laws or political 
realities tend to deliver small majorities and less-than-decisive results. Maintaining or 
building party discipline may thus become a matter of distributing patronage, policy spoils, 
or outright bribes. Coalitions of parties too might lead to such corrupt deal cutting among 
leaders. Weak, divided parties will be less effective at bureaucratic oversight; indeed, 
factions or leaders within them may seek corrupt alliances with bureaucrats as a way to 
gain access to politically useful rewards. The possible scenarios and variations here are 
numerous. The point is that the notion of political competition as a limit on corrupt 




























































































small-number of well-institutionalized parties with strong links to significant, lasting 
groups and interests in society. Where competition falls short of this ideal, it may not 
reduce corruption, but rather could even lead to more of it” .
Political competition increases the risks of corruption only under specific 
conditions—such as media pluralism and independence of the judiciary. As Pujas 
and Rhodes (1998b, 12) noticed, in fact, “a strengthening of democratic checks 
and balances (with the emergence of a stronger and more independent judiciary 
and press) and greater political competition lie behind the proliferation of 
scandals in 1990s”.
Hypothesis 5. Corruption is Favored by the Spread o f Party Power over the 
Public Administration.
Party control over the public administration increase the resources that can be 
invested in the corrupt market, reducing at the same time the possibility of 
reciprocal controls between elected and career administrators. In Italy, an 
overreaching presence of the political parties has been often stigmatized. 
However, as Alessandro Pizzomo (1971) argued many years ago, the “strength” 
or “weakness” of parties can be differently evaluated depending on whether one 
considers the power of reinforcing delegation, procuring advantages for the 
representatives (the party apparatuses, in other words), or that of transmitting the 
demands of the represented.
The use of corrupt practices would seem to be negatively correlated with 
the second kind of party power, reducing parties' ability to elaborate long-term 
programs, mobilize ideological resources, distribute participatory incentives 
and gain the support o f an electorate o f opinion. As revealed in the Italian case, 
by concentrating on the organization of corruption the political parties privilege 
those decisions most productive in terms of bribes rather than those which might 
generate the greatest support among the electorate. In addition, corruption, by its 
very nature, leads to the dominance of hidden over visible politics, small-group 
logic over the search for wider participation. As in the case of the American 
political machine, “the party organization did not play an important role in 
developing alternative courses of municipal governmental action. Indeed, since 
machine politicians drew their resources from the routine operation of 
government, they did not concern themselves with policy formulation” (Wolfinger 
1973, 104). In the long term, the evident squandering of resources connected to 
maladministration impedes corrupt politicians from attracting an electorate of 
opinion by presenting themselves as the bearers of prosperity and progress. The 




























































































Political corruption interacts instead with the parties' power to reinforce 
delegation. In Italy, with the alibi of the “political” nature of administrative 
decisions, the parties have invaded the managing boards of public bodies, using 
their power in ways not always directed to the collective welfare and not always 
lawful. More or less official mechanisms of political control over the nomination 
of certain public-sector bureaucrats have led to the partitizzazione of the public 
administration, producing feuds which the parties and their representatives have 
used for patronage and corruption (for instance, Vassallo 1994; Cotta and Isemia 
1996). The influence of the parties in areas beyond the public administration — 
from banks to newspapers — has led to the an occupation of civil society, further 
lowering the defenses against corruption and mismanagement.
In a similar ways, in the new Southern European democracies, the 
emerging parties found in the occupation of the state apparatuses the resources 
they needed to build their organizations. For instance, in the Portuguese case, 
during the democratic transition and consolidation (in particular, between 1976 
and 1982), parties became channels of individual upward mobility via the sharing 
of spoils (public sinecures, important position in the public administration, etc.) 
between the various parties. Within a system of “lottizzazione”, the electoral 
weight determined the proportion of spoils that went to each party. Also later on, 
the parties used their easy access to public resources to attract clientele of voters 
(Pinto de Sousa 1999).
Also research on such different countries as Spain and Great Britain 
indicated—in line with research on the Italian case—the role of bureaucratic and 
institutional clientelism. In Spain, Hey wood (1998, 11) observed, “the Socialist 
administrations of Felipe Gonzalez (1982-1996) systematically used their control 
of the state machinery to reward party members and sympathizers by giving them 
jobs in the public administration”. If this practice seems to have been less 
developed that in the Italian case, the PSOE “has been more concerned to 
establish links with business firms and entrepreneurs in order to secure party 
funding” (ibid., 11). Even in the UK, where “there is no real evidence of party 
loyalty being rewarded with jobs in the public administration (which is widely 
seen as being virtually free of corruption). None the less, the resources of the 
state can be used to promote party interests, as appears to have been happening 




























































































The diffusion of corrupt exchanges is possible only thanks to the parties' 
assumption of certain particular functions. The research on the Italian case (in 
particular, della Porta and Vannucci 1999a, chapter 4) allows to develop the 
following hypotheses on the role played by political parties when political 
corruption becomes systemic. These hypotheses apply, in fact, not to occasional, 
petty corruption, but only to “systemic corruption”, when “the illicit becomes the 
norm and (...) corruption is so common and institutionalized that those behaving 
illegally are rewarded and those continuing to accept the older norms penalized” 
(Caiden and Caiden 1977, p. 306).
Hypothesis 6. When Political Corruption Becomes Systemic, Political Parties 
Act as Guarantors o f Illegal Business
The research on the Italian case indicated that political parties have occupied civil 
society not in order to realize long-term political programs but with the aim of 
facilitating the extraction of a parasitic rent. The “occupation of the public 
administration”, in fact, allows the parties to secure continuity to the game of 
corruption through its diffusion in every geographical area, in the various public 
bodies and in the different sectors of the public administration: whoever respects 
the unlawful agreements can continue to do business with the public 
administration; anyone who opts out on a given occasion will be permanently 
excluded from the market for public works. Controlling the nominations to public 
bodies, the parties can generalize the kickback, transforming corruption into an 
established practice with accepted norms, at the same time guaranteeing the 
continuity of the system over time despite changes in the political personnel of the 
public administration. The parties assume, that is to say, the function of 
guarantors o f the illegal bargain, participating in those operations demanding a 
“certification of trust: in other words, the promises of others, requiring to be 
guaranteed in some way, are used to obtain a benefit” (Pizzomo 1992, 31).
The political parties' role as guarantors means that it is no longer necessary 
to trust one's partner in corrupt exchange personally (although both partners must 
of course be convinced of the protector's ability to enforce the agreement). The 
accumulation of trust within the political party permits the sanctioning of other 
trades which—like those between citizens and representatives—are not legally 
enforceable, nor are self-enforcing: corrupt exchanges. As the currency issued by 
the State is guaranteed as official medium of exchange, so the trust in the 
fulfillment of promises or the collection of credits, which is offered by political 
organizations, permits the reduction of otherwise very high transaction costs. 
Authority within parties becomes then a resource for the strengthening of beliefs




























































































or expectations that persons will honor their promises in the corruption market. 
The protection provided by the political parties appears important in settling the 
controversies that can emerge between the various actors in corrupt exchanges, 
both at the central and at the local level.
Hypothesis 7. When Political Corruption Becomes Systemic, the Political 
Parties Sanction Occult Transactions.
Parties are able to reward those who collaborate with, and to punish those who 
are not willing to play the corrupt game. Like all illegal transactions, the corrupt 
transaction is characterized by a particular deficit of trust: in fact, while in a legal 
transaction the law protects the contracting parties against possible 
transgressions, in illegal markets other actors must assume the role of guarantor. 
The political parties represent one of these actors whose function is to reduce the 
costs and risks of illegal business.
The party presence in the public administration offers the various 
participants in occult transactions the possibility of distributing sanctions, such as 
exclusion from the corrupt game: “On the territory there is a network of political 
machines aimed at making widespread, continuous and reciprocally protected 
corrupt exchanges” (Belligni 1995, 178). In the circumstances of illegality 
associated with occult transactions, the political parties can be likened to a credit 
agency managing trust between the various parties involved (Pizzomo 1992, 32- 
33). Given their widespread power of nominating the upper levels of public 
bodies, the parties can “sanction particular transactions thanks to their punitive 
power over political administrators and private individuals, guaranteeing the 
fulfillment of secret agreements and the overall functioning of the illegal market 
within distributive ‘norms' created over time” (Vannucci 1993, 85; also Vannucci 
1998). In fact, the accomplishment of these functions were rewarded with the 
allocation of a “supplementary” quota of the bribes to the parties, over and above 
that received by individual administrators involved in the decisions necessary for 
closing the secret deal.
Hypothesis 8. When Corruption Becomes Systemic, the Political Parties Play an 
Important Role in Socializing their Members to Illegality
Corruption transforms the party system into an institution of socialization in 
illegality. As criminologists have observed long ago, “criminal behavior is 
learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication” 
(Sutherland and Cressey 1974, 75). In the case of political corruption in Italy, this 
communication process developed in particular inside the political parties 




























































































the rules of the (illegal) game, permitting the system of occult transaction to 
expand. Political parties spread in the political system values that justified 
corruption as the “normal” way of doing politics. White collar crime has been 
explained with reference to work-related subcultures3: “These work-related 
subcultures tend to isolate their members from the mainstream of social life and 
its construction of reality ... Because of this isolation, work-related subcultures 
are often able to maintain a definition of certain criminal activities as acceptable 
or even required behavior, when they are clearly condemned by society as a 
whole” (Coleman 1987, 422-23). In the case of corruption in Italy, political 
parties facilitate corruption by reducing the moral barrier against illegal actions:
Political party membership, and the experience of political life in general, 
also has secondary socializing effects which become constitutive of a person's 
identity and therefore of their moral principles. Someone belonging to a political 
association can receive recognition for: technical or cultural abilities; loyalty, or 
conformism, in ideological commitment; loyalty to a particular leader; astuteness, 
aggressivity or lack of scruples in “taking out” adversaries; capacity for forming 
links with the wider society and bringing in money for party funds or other kinds 
of contribution; or, naturally, some combination of these qualities. The “moral 
quality” of associated life will vary according to the prevailing criteria for 
recognition. The more an individual's activity and relations are restricted to the 
concerns of party life the more the identifications on which identity is modeled 
will reflect its “moral quality”, and on this will depend the moral cost of 
corruption. The more corruption is diffuse the more political parties themselves 
function as agencies for socialization in illegality, reducing the moral cost paid by 
their members for participation in corrupt practices (Pizzomo 1992, 47).
Politicians already “introduced” to the rules of the illegal marketplace 
introduce others in their turn. Loyalty to the party serves in obtaining 
appointments, which are then paid for in the distribution of the money acquired 
through corruption. The corrupt party “places” its men in various positions of 
responsibility in public bodies; in return it demands that they “conform” to the 
“rules”, using those positions not only for personal enrichment, but also for 
(illegal) party financing. Through the parties' assumption of this role in socializing 
to corruption, the system of occult transactions expands. Susan Pharr’s analysis 
of attitudes towards corruption in Japan indicates also a correlation between 
support for the governmental party and tolerance for corruption: “ethical laxness 
is in fact a significant predictor of supporting the LPD” (1998, 19). It is therefore
3 Work related subculture are “epistemic communities that provide the locus for specialized 





























































































also likely that parties involved in corruption tend to socialize also their voters to 
accept corruption and illegal practices.
Hypothesis 9. When Political corruption Becomes Systemic, Political Parties 
Reduce the Risks Involved in Illegal Exchanges
Protected by their common membership in the party system corrupt politicians 
can offer each other a series of reciprocal “services” which reduce the risks of 
participation in the market of corruption. Besides acting as “notaries” for occult 
transactions, keeping note of rules and exchanges, the parties become efficient 
agencies of commercial mediation, equipped with up-to-date databanks on the 
partners available for illegal operations. By exchanging confidential information 
corrupt politicians reduce the costs of identifying other parties on the illegal 
market. In Italy, the magistrates have reconstructed what amount to nothing less 
than “handovers” between particular administrators, whether of the same or of 
different parties. In particular, the successive presence of members of the same 
party in running an institution facilitated corrupt transactions, reducing the risks 
that would have resulted from a re-negotiation of the illegal agreements. 
Exchanges of information however were not limited to members of a single party. 
In the judicial documents, in fact, we also found ritualized “handovers” between 
politicians of different parties, with the “presentation” of entrepreneurs already 
involved in corruption to successors in office.
III. How Participation in Occult Transactions Transforms the Way in which 
the Parties Fulfill their Traditional Tasks
Political corruption acts on the three main functions of the political parties: the 
selection of personnel, the integration of the citizens, and the formation of public 
policies.
Hypothesis 10. When Political Corruption Becomes Systemic, the Political 
Parties Select Business Politicians.
As far as the selection o f political personnel is concerned, in a functioning 
democracy politicians must be capable of elaborating general programs, 
convincing citizens of their benefits and putting them into practice. The rewards 
will be public: appreciation, power and prestige should count for more than 
material advantage. With the development of political corruption, however, the 
characteristics of the political class are transformed. The parties begin to select 
those individuals most proficient in the organization of illegal financing. In a 




























































































which can be made in certain positions it is to be expected that certain politicians 
will try to influence the internal decision-making process in order to occupy these 
positions, investing both their own resources and, where possible, those of their 
organization. In other words, the institutional mechanisms for selecting political 
and bureaucratic personnel are altered in favor of individuals with fewer scruples 
and who are willing to “invest” in creating influence. In this way political 
corruption leads to the proliferation of actors who do not properly belong either 
to the state or to the market and therefore “violate” the rules of functioning of 
both. In the research on the Italian case, this type of actors were defined as 
“business politicians” (see della Porta and Vannucci 1999a, chapter 3). As 
Pizzorno has noted, “the sense of party membership is altered. One no longer 
joins to contribute voluntarily to the work of government, but in order to be 
admitted to the competition for positions of private interest ... The various 
filtering processes, then, will be designed to ascertain whether the future business 
politician is a person willing to participate in illicit practices or who, at the least, 
will behave ‘responsibly' and pose no moral objections should he become aware 
of them” (Pizzorno 1992, 27).
Not only in “vicious” Italy, business politicians substitute for the 
ideological politicians of the past. Even in the “virtuous” Great Britain, “Whilst 
the Conservative Party has a long history of ‘business politicians’ (in the sense of 
MPs with direct involvement in, or close association with, the business and 
financial worlds), similar accusations have recently been leveled at the Blair 
administration” (Heywood 1998, 14).
Hypothesis 11. When Political Corruption Becomes Systemic, the Political 
Parties Develop Clientelistic Relationships with the Electors.
A second function of political parties is the legitimization of the political system 
through the integration o f citizens. In a democracy, the parties are the principal 
actors in the structuration of the vote, creating electoral identifications that are 
frequently maintained over generations. The structuring of the vote takes place by 
the definition of programs that are then proposed to the electorate. The search for 
the highest number of votes should lead the various parties to represent the 
opinions and interests of particular groups of citizens.
Research on the Italian case indicated, however, that the diffusion of 
corruption transform the structure of electoral preferences: rather than the vote of 
identification or opinion, the cliental use of the vote as an object of exchange 
prevails — vote in exchange for favor. Political corruption produces, in fact, a 
value system oriented to the fulfillment of individual objectives through 




























































































discourages “ideological” types of relations based on intrinsic or expressive 
benefits. The use of corrupt practices has reduced the capacity of the parties to 
mobilize ideological resources and distribute participatory incentives. We can 
say, therefore, that political corruption, by encouraging the diffusion of a structure 
of preferences oriented to individual mobilization, erodes the effective capacity of 
the parties to integrate, select and mediate citizens' interests.
While political analyses, including those on the Italian case4, have normally 
underlined the negative consequences of the excessive use of ideological 
incentives by political parties, the recent scandals signal the risks attached to the 
opposite condition: the excessive availability of material incentives.5
Hypothesis 12. When Political Corruption Becomes Systemic, the Political 
Parties Select Demands that are Supposed to Bring More Bribes.
A third function of political parties in a democracy is the formation o f public 
policy: in a functioning democracy the parties have the job of defining the 
direction of public policy and controlling its implementation. The definition of 
public demand is a pivotal moment in the democratic political process since it is 
here that the administrative system is confronted with the needs and demands of 
social groups. Political mediation is the filter through which interests are 
articulated and aggregated, and its task, as Pizzomo has pointed out, is “to 
identify and interpret the needs and desires of the population; select and 
generalize those which can be expressed in political terms; propose, justify and 
criticize policies and measures to achieve these ends or, when necessary, to 
explain why they cannot be satisfied” (Pizzomo 1992, 22).
Corruption radically alters this function, privileging the satisfaction of so- 
called “internal demand” (Chevallier and Loschak 1983, 113). Concentrating on 
the organization of corruption the parties have privileged those decisions most 
“productive” in terms of bribes; the tendency is to spend most in those sectors 
where controls are weakest.
Research on Italy indicates a fragmentation of public demand in order to 
satisfy particular interests while, at the same time, no wider vision of the
4 Italy has long been considered the paradigmatic case of polarised pluralism, characterised by 
a plurality of political parties, the existence of anti-system parties, a division into two hostile 
ideological camps and a dynamic of centrifugal competition (Sartori 1970).
5 . Viceversa, in Chile the presence of strong ideological cleavages may explain why “Chile 
stands out as a country in which corruption is not perceived as widespread as in the rest of 




























































































problems develops among the various public officials involved. In fact, when 
political corruption is systemic, the parties' discretional management of public 
spending often becomes an objective in itself. The aim of administrators is to 
attract as large a quantity of resources as possible to the areas where they have 
power in order to pocket a fee for mediation in the form of a bribe and/or gain 
support as a result of the effects of public investment on employment (treated as a 
sphere for clientelistic exchange). Public spending is therefore diverted to those 
sectors where gains from corruption are greatest and in which the discretional 
nature of the procedures reduces the risks involved. In general, little attention is 
paid to whether these works or services serve the needs of the collectivity. It is 
not even necessary that they are completed or brought into use, as demonstrated 
by the countless projects never finished or never actually used. Predictably, the 
priority given to obtaining funding brings about scarce regard for the quality of 
the projects that are at the basis of public demand. Public demand may remain 
unsatisfied in this context if the politicians involved do not find the amount 
offered by way of bribes sufficient.
IV. How Corruption Affects the Party System
Political corruption affects not only the individual parties, but also the 
characteristics of the party system, in particular of the competition between 
parties.
Hypothesis 13. Political Corruption Favors the Development o f Connivance in 
the Party System
The distribution of public power frequently means that it is impossible for a single 
agent to offer the service demanded by a corrupter. When corruption is practiced 
by a number of politicians in collaboration, centralized power management and a 
consensual division of the proceeds become necessary; power-sharing brings the 
risk of contention, reciprocal denunciations and judicial investigation if 
disagreements arise (Harendra 1989, 507). As long as those involved are all 
subject to a single Centre of power (a party secretariat to which all owe their 
election or nomination, for example) disagreements can be recomposed at that 
level. However, many decisions involve individuals from different parties, party 
currents or factions, who are not therefore subject to a single authority having the 
power to smooth over subterranean antagonisms and conflict. In such cases open . 
conflict may well lead to disastrous consequences for all. In order to avoid these 




























































































Research on corruption in Italy indicates that such agreements were 
sometimes based on a fixed distribution of public contracts among firms based on 
the color of their political protection (or to consortia whose composition reflects 
the relative weight of the various power centers) or on distributing payoffs 
according to the electoral strength of the parties involved. In other cases, the 
agreement took place in an earlier phase and regarded the powers employed in 
attracting bribes rather than the proceeds. For example, the management board of 
the national electricity body, the ENEL, was composed of eight directors 
appointed by the political parties. According to one of them, “each director was 
responsible for procuring his own party money. A tacit understanding was 
reached: each looked after their own back yard and stayed out of the others' 
business” (Panorama 14/2/1993, 46). The apportioning of offices among the 
various political parties therefore gave each political actor control over certain, 
defined areas of public activity, areas which were negotiated or arranged at a 
higher level.
In the Italian party system, the concentration of single parties on gathering 
illegal income has favoured the search for reciprocal connivance. On at least one 
point a secret, non-belligerence treaty accompanied the fierce clandestine battles 
over the division of these funds: the non-denunciation of the system of corruption. 
While in the visible political arena the political groups tried to gain votes by 
distinguishing between themselves through open (more or less ideological) 
competition (Pizzomo 1993), in the secret political arena (including the market 
for corruption) there was a strong tendency towards inter-party collusion.
Not only in Italy a collusion between governmental and opposition parties 
seems to be common practice as far as corruption is concerned. Another, extreme 
case is Japan, where the silence of the opposition seems to have been bought 
through relevant sums of money paid from the conservatives to their adversaries— 
sometimes behind the screen of a fake mah-jong game between politicians of the 
government and the opposition (Bouissou 1997, 140-2). In general, cartel parties, 
characterized already by collusion with a massive use of public financing, 
manifest they reciprocal solidarity when scandals related to party financing 
emerge.6 In the French context Becquart-Leclercq (1989, 205) observes within 
the network of corruption a shared adherence to operational modes of implicit 
codes which include “the conspiracy of silence: it operates particularly between 
leaders of various political parties, despite their sometimes bitter and violent 
conflicts; to survive, all must respect the rules of the game and maintain silence
6 For example, see Frognier (1986) on Belgium; Roth (1989) and Seibel (1997) on Germany; 




























































































about the rules themselves”. In Germany, resilience to scandals was connected to 
the organizational oligopoly on which parties could build. The stability of this 
system rests, above all, on a strong interparty consensus about the basic rules of 
the game (including the legal/illegal ways of party financing), and on the 
commonly shared interest of the 'established' parties to retain their de facto 
monopoly of public decision-making and to guard it against outside forces. This 
common interest has in large part suspended the functioning of the checks and 
balances and the institutional mechanisms of control usually associated, at least in 
theory, to competitive party systems, replacing them with conventional patterns of 
tacit agreement and mutual privilege enhancement (Blankenburg, Staudhammer, 
Steinert 1989, 922).
Hypothesis 14. When Corruption is Systemic, Other Invisible Actors May 
Substitute the Political Parties as Guarantors o f the Illegal Exchanges
If corruption has transformed the foundations of power within the parties and 
their functions, it can be added that the influence of the parties in the operation of 
networks of corruption varies considerably from one geographical area to 
another. In the Italian situation, in particular in the South, organized crime 
intervened to provide the resources of violence (or “private policing”) the 
widespread system of illegal exchanges needed in order to impose compliance to 
the rules of the game. Mafia, ‘ndrangeta and camorra surrogated for the 
organizational weakness of political parties and, at the same time, contributed to 
increase that weakness. As the ex-mayor of Reggio Calabria observed:
The difference between kickbacks in the North and South is that [in the North] there is 
a centralized structure. A net controlled and run in a unitary fashion. The party collects the 
money and then divides it among the factions, after retaining what is required for the party 
itself. Here [in the South], on the other hand, it is exactly the reverse. If whoever collects 
is the head of the party at that moment, that's where the money finishes up. But it’s a 
subterfuge. In reality, the party means one's own faction or corresponds to immediate 
group interests. It is not a small difference. The mechanism provokes tensions and 
dramatizes the whole of political life. Worse than that, everything else—alliances, 
decisions—is subordinated to bribery and money (Licandro and Varano 1993, 122-23).
In certain regions of Southern Italy in particular, organized crime partly 
substituted for the political parties in the function of certifying trust between those 
involved in occult exchange and consequently receives a part of the bribes. 
Although not to the same extent, also in the Belgian case, criminal organizations 
grew in the nineties, and tried to develop linkages with police, judges and 
politicians. As Lieven de Winter (1998, 16) remarked, “although organized crime 




























































































of public market attributions, this new actor has found a fertile ground and can 
easily overtake the profits from ‘rotten markets’”.
In general, therefore, we can state that, if in system of systemic corruption 
parties function as guarantors of illegal exchanges, they are however not alone in 
doing so. Alongside them, in fact, are ranged a series of aggregations — some of 
them formal, others not -- all of which have in common a low level of visibility: 
“deviated” freemasonry lodges, organized crime etc.. Political corruption, being 
based on occult transactions, subtracts in fact power from visible sites. The 
arenas of decision-making therefore tend to shift from visible to hidden politics, 
where the parties are not necessarily the dominant actors. Weakened by the 
spread of corruption, the parties become supporting actors, behind the scenes of 
the crypto-government in which the real decisions concerning the public sphere 
were taken.
V. How Political Corruption Transforms the Party Structure
Political corruption also produces the development of “hidden” structures in the 
political parties.
Hypothesis 15. When Political Corruption Becomes Systemic, Positions 
Connected with Clandestine Financial Transactions Acquire Greater and 
Greater Importance.
Systemic corruption leads to an ever-diminishing prestige of visible as opposed to 
invisible political positions, increasing the power of those who manage the 
collection and distribution of bribes. In Italy, secret structures were constituted 
within the parties, devoted to the gathering and administration of illegal funding. 
A fundamental role in organizing the business of corruption was in fact played by 
those whom, in the course of recent scandals, the press referred to as “party 
cashiers”. While occasionally to be found as administrative secretaries of parties, 
more frequently they occupy “informal” positions, recognized only within the 
invisible organizational structures which exist inside the parties. Their careers are 
founded on the party’s confidence in their ability to bring in contributions, legally 
or otherwise, and to manage them in an “honest” and “reliable” manner. Such 
individuals were described in the following terms to the Milanese magistrates:
Each party has referents responsible for controlling the allocation of 
contracts, maintaining the contacts with the different companies and collecting 
bribes, or having them collected. They also try to place trusted politicians on the 






























































































[thus]] vising what are really prearranged deals on bribery with formally legal 
agreements and legitimation (Panorama, 12/7/1992, 27).
cashier's function, in fact, is to organize both the legal and illegal 
j1£fln5ifcing of his party. In doing so he must mediate between and coordinate a 
plurality of networks composed of different kinds of actor. The cashiers of the 
various parties had the task of co-ordinating the collection among themselves, 
reducing the amount of energy any one party needs to invest in occult exchange. 
The “municipal cashiers” in particular operated with each other in a coordinated 
way, taking it in turn to demand and collect bribes for all the parties and 
thereafter redistributing them according to precise (but unwritten) rules (della 
Porta 1992). Within the transversal structures that existed for the collection and 
distribution of illegal funds, the various party representatives even alternated in 
fulfilling the functions of cashier and redistributor. In complete consociational 
agreement, the “cashiers” of one party would occasionally carry out then- 
activities in the headquarters of another or would meet together in order to 
redistribute the proceeds of bribery. Thus the figure of the “collective cashier” 
emerged. The “national cashiers” also met in order “to work out in agreement 
between themselves the best strategies for obtaining contributions from 
enterprises, even where this is in violation of the law on political financing” 
(Chamber of Deputies 1993, 10).
Besides coordinating the activities of the various actors involved in 
corruption, the cashier system also limits the amount of compromising 
information in circulation. It is the cashiers, in fact, who maintain relations with 
those who gravitate in the orbit of the political parties in search of favors, in 
particular entrepreneurs operating in the public sector. Although in no way 
official, the position they hold is well known to businessmen, and it is to the 
cashiers that they turn for resolving technical or bureaucratic difficulties regarding 
public contracts.
Naturally, this “confidentiality” concerning the origin and distribution of 
bribery money heightens the power of the cashiers, frequently the only ones who 
possess a detailed knowledge of the mechanisms and regulations governing its 
allocation. For this reason, party cashiers, in order to acquire a favorable 
“reputation” in the market of corruption, must adhere to a particular conception of 




























































































subject to legal ratification, naturally, and whose violation cannot be legally 
punished.7
Hypothesis 16. When Political Corruption Becomes Systemic, Invisible, 
Unofficial Structures Tend to Emerge in the Parties
The various actors involved in corrupt exchanges are connected, often across 
party lines, in an invisible organizational structure. As a result of the spread of 
political corruption the personal secretariats of individual bosses acquired a 
growing importance. According to the research on the Italian case, a fundamental 
step in the career of any business politician was the creation of a private 
“headquarters”, a personal secretariat, often disguised as a research Centre or 
some form of enterprise. The function of these restricted spaces in the life of 
parties permeated by corruption is explained by the Milanese ex-administrator 
Mario Chiesa:
I had my private office as well. In the city-Centre, in via Castelfidardo. A long way from 
Quarto Oggiaro. Two rooms on the ground floor of Number 11. A table for meetings, a 
telephone, an office for the secretary. The transformation of the PSI from a party of 
militants to a party of clients made finding via Castelfidardo necessary. The section, even 
when normalized and run by loyal comrades, wasn't a suitable place for a certain kind of 
politics. For example, I couldn't call restricted meetings in the section. If a member of the 
rank and file, passing and seeing the lights on, was tempted to come in, I would have had 
to change subject. If he didn't and felt emarginated because he hadn't been asked to attend, 
then he would have been less friendly at the opportune moment. A visual control on your 
activity has heavy costs (in Andreoli 1993, 29, emphasis added).
As emerges clearly from this testimony, the reasons for creating personal 
secretariats lie precisely in that (even minimum of) control which the visible 
structures of the party imply. If the organization of the system of corruption 
required more discrete sites, the sections were not, however, shut down: on the 
contrary, they often grew in size. But they changed functions, becoming the sites 
for assembling “paper members” ['falsi tesserati”], “ready for making up the 
numbers at meetings and demonstrations and disciplined participation at section, 
ward or municipal congresses” (Mario Chiesa, in Andreoli 1993, 35). Clubs and 
(fake) research institute mushroomed around party bosses, responding to their 
need to escape any internal democratic control, and create flexible and less 
visible structures (della Porta 1992, 202).
7 Similar to party cashiers, in their role and resources, are the personal secretaries of 




























































































Hypothesis 17. When Political Corruption Becomes Systemic, the Growth o f an 
Invisible Party Structure Produces Centrifugal Tendencies in the Parties
As happens in illegal systems, the degree of vertical centralization that corrupt 
networks are able to attain seems to be relatively low. The evidence of Italian 
politicians involved in judicial investigations offers a picture of the system of 
corruption as a multicephalous collection of networks gathered around individual 
bosses, with only a few points of coordination from above. The parties were 
fragmented into numerous groups based on blind, if temporary, obedience to a 
boss. The power of each boss rested on a nucleus of faithful followers, with a 
clan-like solidarity. This led to a monetarization and parcellization of power, the 
decline of internal loyalty, and the transformation of the party into a series of 
networks in a permanent state of internecine war. According to one of the judges 
who led the “mani pulite” investigation, Piercamillo Davigo, “A lot of the illicit 
founds were used by the politicians of the different fractions to buy party 
membership cards. ... These membership cards were used to established power 
relations inside the parties ... The parties were transformed into joint-stock 
companies, where bribes were used to buy shares in order to acquire the 
possibility to be re-elected” (Davigo 1993, 11).
VI. Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper was to put forward some hypotheses on the development of 
corruption and its interaction with political parties and party systems. In 
particular, I discussed hypotheses emerging from research on the Italian case, 
confronting them with evidences from other countries. Although by no way 
systematic, the comparison with other cases helped to specify some hypotheses. 
As it is often the case with comparative politics, one of the most important result 
of the first attempt to go beyond the single case study is the emergence of a need 
for a more refined definition of the concept of corruption, and the development of 
typologies for the different forms of the phenomena. This is a main task for future 
comparative research on corruption.
A second conclusive remark is in order. The research on the Italian case 
indicated the insufficiency of causal explanations, in particular for long-lasting 
and complex phenomena such as corruption. Also this attempt to generalize 
beyond the Italian case support the view that we cannot understand systemic 
corruption without the combined analysis not only of preconditions for 
corruption, but also of the action of the corrupt institutions to reproduce the 
preconditions for their own development. The comparative analysis seems to 




























































































as cost of politics, cartel parties, organizational fragmentation, occupation of the 
public administration, week competition between government and opposition, 
etc.—seems to favor corruption. We have to add, however that, at its turn, 
corruption transforms parties and party systems: it increases the cost of politics, 
reduces the capacity of political parties to form collective identities, introduces 
centrifugal tendencies inside the party, strengthens the party grasp on the public 
administrations, spreading clientelistic relationships, attracting business 
politicians, enforces the power of the hidden party structures. Moreover, when 
political corruption is systemic, political parties act as guarantors of the illegal 
exchanges, socialize their members to illegality, sanction illegal transactions, 
reduce the risks involved in corrupt exchanges. More information on the “internal 
dynamics” of corruption are needed in order to specify the hypotheses developed 
from the rich materials available on the Italian case.
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